Flores v. Am. Seafoods Co. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 335 F.3d 904 (Decided July 9, 2003) by Joe Tully \u2705
Admiralty Practicum 
Volume 2003 
Issue 2 Fall 2003 Article 7 
February 2018 
Flores v. Am. Seafoods Co. United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit 335 F.3d 904 (Decided July 9, 2003) 
Joe Tully '05 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/admiralty_practicum 
 Part of the Admiralty Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joe Tully '05 (2003) "Flores v. Am. Seafoods Co. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 335 
F.3d 904 (Decided July 9, 2003)," Admiralty Practicum: Vol. 2003 : Iss. 2 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/admiralty_practicum/vol2003/iss2/7 
This Recent Admiralty Cases is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Admiralty Practicum by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
FISHING AGREEMENTS UNDER 46 U.S.C. § 10601(a) 
I n  order to meet the statutory requirements, fishing agreements must be in 'writing 
and must be signed by the master or someone in charge of the vessel. Also, the 
State' s statute regarding awarding attorney' s  fees is pre-empted by the federal 
policy of not awarding them in maritime cases. 
Flores v. Am. Seafoods Co. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
335 F.3d 904 
(Decided July 9, 2003) 
Appellants, Elias Flores and Jose Toledo ("appellants"), each signed an 
employment contract with American Seafoods Company ("ASC") on January 11, 2000 at 
an orientation meeting in Seattle, Washington. Representing ASC at that meeting was 
Cathy Udoff ("Udoff'), who signed the employment contracts on behalf of ASC and the 
vessel masters, who had previously delegated to Udoff, via a written form, the authority 
to sign on their behalf. The appellant's complaints center around 46 U.S.C. § 10601(a), 
which at the time of the dispute provided that a "fishing agreement" must be "in writing" 
and signed by the "master." 
Besides signing the employment contract, Udoff was also charged with explaining 
the compensation provided by its terms. By its terms, compensation would come 
primarily from a "crew share pool." The number of shares in the pool would be 
determined before the season began and the value of the pool would be calculated at the 
end of the season by multiplying the number of shares by a posted price for the fish, 
which was based on a good faith estimate made by ASC at the beginning of the season. 
The contract also provided for performance bonuses based on discretionary employee 
evaluations. Udoff orally explained how the evaluation ratings would be measured, how 
the total number of shares would be derived, and how the bonus pool would be valued at 
the orientation. Since the performance bonuses were based on the evaluation ratings, the 
number of shares and the value of those shares could not be determined until the fishing 
season was over. 
Soon after the season had ended, the appellants filed suit, raising a number of 
claims. First they argued that the oral presentation of the bonus provision meant that the 
contracts were not "in writing." Second they argued that because the vessel masters had 
delegated the signing of the contracts to an agent, the contracts were not signed by the 
vessel masters, as required by statute. Appellants also raised two claims alleging breach 
of contract: that ASC had breached their contract by funding the bonus pool out of the 
"crew share pool" and that they had failed to make a good faith estimate of the "posted 
price" used in the "crew share" formula. Lastly, the appellants sought attorney's fees and 
expanded litigation costs as provided by Washington State Statute. 
At trial, the district court found that ASC had breached the contract by failing to 
make a good faith estimate of the "posted price," but found the employees suffered no 
damages since ASC had made a post-season adjustment to cover any shortfall the 
employees suffered. It also found a breach resulted when ASC funded the bonus pool 
from the crew share pool and awarded damages and prejudgment interest. The court 
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rejected both claims made under§ 1060l (a). As for the attorney's fees, the court found 
that although a choice-of-laws provision in the contract provided federal law would apply 
to all disputes, the state statute awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a wage 
dispute was not pre-empted by federal law. 
Appellants appealed their claims under § 10601(a), while ASC cross-appealed, 
challenging the award of attorney's fees and the trial court's finding that the contract 
required ASC to fund the bonus pool independent of the crew share pool. 
The Ninth Circuit first addressed the contract provisions regarding the two pools 
of funds. Giving effect to the choice-of-law provision in the contract, the court applied 
federal common law in interpreting the contract. Therefore, as required by federal law, 
the court read the contract "as a whole and every part interpreted in reference to the 
whole, with preference given to reasonable interpretations." Applying this standard, the 
court found the "crew share" provision was unambiguous and could only be understood 
as distinct from the "bonus pool." Supporting this conclusion was the distinct way shares 
were assigned in each pool, with the "crew share" number set at the beginning of the 
season and the bonus share pool, dependent as it was on the completion of the 
performance evaluations, being set at the end. Assessing the explanations provided by 
ASC of the compensation scheme at the orientation, the court found that these did not 
contradict the plain meaning of the statute and concluded a crewmember would still have 
every reason to believe the "bonus pool" was funded independent of the "crew share 
pool." 
Next the court examined the appellant's claim that the bonus provisions, because 
they were discretionary, rendered the contracts illusory. The court found the discretion 
retained by ASC did not render the contracts illusory. Agreeing with the Third Circuit 
and the Restatement of Contracts, the court found that under federal law both parties to a 
contract have a duty to perform in good faith. Looking to the terms of the contract, the 
court found ASC was required to award bonuses when a seaman attained a favorable 
performance rating, which was to be assigned reasonably and in good faith; therefore this 
provision was not illusory. 
The court then examined the appellant's claims raised under 46 U.S.C. § 
10601(a). The first claim argued the contract was invalid since it was not "in writing." 
Since there was no precedent from the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit addressing this 
issue, the court examined the policy behind the "in writing" requirement. In Seattle F{rst 
National Bank v. Conway, 98 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1996), the same court said the provision 
is designed to protect seamen from "duress, coercion, or deception." The court found 
that although ASC and Udoff, as their representative, may have been careless in 
explaining the compensation system and, although their explanation was incomplete, 
ASC was not willfully deceptive. Only in cases were oral terms were imposed under 
duress or where coercion or deception was involve, the court said, should a fishing 
agreement which contains both oral and written terms be voided. 
Next, the court addressed the appellant's argument that the vessel masters, by 
delegating to Udoff the authority to sign in their name, failed to sign the contract as 
required by§ 10601 (a). Applying the same standard it had in deciding the contract was 
indeed "in writing," the court found a master's delegation of authority to sign in his name 
did not protect him from the claims of seamen alleging duress, coercion, or deception. So 
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here, Udoff s signing of the contracts did not frustrate the goals of§ 10601 (a) and did not 
render the contract void. 
Finally, the court addressed the issue of attorney's fees. Applying federal 
common law, the court looked to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 
Specifically, the court looked to § 187(2), which says the law chosen by the parties 
should apply unless: (a) "the chosen state has no relationship to the party or parties and 
there is no reasonable basis for the parties' choice" or (b) "application of the law of the 
chosen state would be contrary to the policy of a state which has a materially greater 
interest in the determination of the particular issue . . .. " Addressing subsection 2(a), the 
court found the United States has a substantial relationship to the parties; since 
traditionally maritime employment contracts have been governed by federal law and in 
this instance the appellants had sought relief under federal law. Under subsection 2(b), 
even if the State of Washington had a strong public interest in this matter, there was no 
showing that Washington had a materially greater interest that the U.S. Although to be 
effective, the choice-of-laws provision would only have to satisfy one of the two 
alternative requirements under § 187(2), the court found it had satisfied both. Since 
federal maritime law made no provision for attorney's fees, the court found that they 
should not be awarded here. 
In concluding, the court addressed and discarded appellant's arguments why § 
10601 (a) should not apply. First, the court said the federal maritime choice-of-law 
principles, derived from the Supreme Court's decision in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 245 U.S. 
571 (1953), did not apply in situations, such as here, where there was a choice-of-laws 
clause and furthermore, Lauritzen did not supercede § 187 as a matter of course. Next, 
the court found no basis in the record that the ASC' employment contract was an 
adhesion contract, which would preclude application of a choice-of-laws provision where 
substantial injustice would occur to the adherent. Lastly, the appellants contested the use 
of the Restatement in a matter involving a choice between federal law and the law of a 
particular state. Although acknowledging the Restatement was not meant to be applied in 
a situation involving federal-state preemption, the court found this was not the case here. 
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